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Contents

The University in Transition

  1. Prologue
  2. Chapter 1. A Brief History of the University
  3. Chapter 2. The Transition to Open Science
  4. Chapter 3. Education
  5. Chapter 4. Community
  6. Chapter 5. Society
  7. Chapter 6. Organisation, Administration, and Staff & Student Representation
  8. Epilogue
  9. Special thanks to
  10. Works Cited

The University in Transition: Chapter 6. Organisation, Administration, and Staff & Student Representation

The University in Transition
Chapter 6. Organisation, Administration, and Staff & Student Representation

    “Chapter 6. Organisation, Administration, and Staff & Student Representation” in “The University in Transition”

    Organisation, Administration, and Staff & Student Representation

    Introduction

    Previous chapters have discussed key developments in education and research and have outlined some inviting perspectives. We have seen that the university relates - and wants to relate - differently to society. All of this also has implications for the university community, as outlined in Chapter 4. Naturally, these developments must also be reflected in the university’s decision-making process. Because democratic constitutional states abide by a fundamental principle that no powers can be exercised in the public domain without those affected by decisions having the ability to influence the content of the decision-making process, either directly or indirectly (via representation and accountability structures). This is essential for the acceptance and acceptability of decisions.[1] Some important decisions are made within universities, with a view to a limited number of goals, namely education, research, and societal impact. That is why they are also referred to as ‘mission-based communities’, unlike municipalities, provinces, or the state, for example, which have a wide range of powers over an entire territory and are therefore referred to as ‘area communities’. This classification is important for at least two reasons. First, for the delimitation of powers. For example: the university does not have a say in the central government’s foreign policy. But far more important in this context is that the university is also legally a community[2], which means that there is a nexus of administrators who make decisions, those affected by the decisions (students and staff), and their representatives (university councils, and, at a further decentralised level, faculty councils and programme committees). Such a community context presupposes interaction and involvement between the three relevant actors. If this interaction and involvement is lacking, serious problems may arise around the legitimacy and quality of decision-making within that community. Because democracy also contributes to substantively better decisions[3], and ultimately to the well-being and welfare of those who are part of the university community.

    The question at the heart of this chapter is how the university, as an organisation, can better equip itself for the future. Because it is clear that for the important developments the university is going through, the participation of staff and students is crucial. They will bear the burden and reap the benefits of the developments outlined in the previous chapters. Or rather, they must enable them. But that is where challenges lie.

    When first we look at the more formal, representative democracy within the university, we should note that turnout for representative body elections has been very low for many years. This poses a threat not only to the legitimacy of those bodies themselves, but also to the decision-making process to which they contribute. There are also major concerns about exercising the right to stand for election; it takes a lot of effort to find candidates for the representative bodies, and some groups seem to have lost interest in doing so altogether, such as professors.

    Aside from these, largely familiar, problems, there are also relatively new developments that raise questions about how the university’s democracy is organised. For example, research and education activities are increasingly being organised across the boundaries of disciplines and faculties. This requires a re-think of the employee and student participation structures. Who is responsible for quality assurance in multi- and interdisciplinary education programmes? Partly similar questions arise in research. If research funds are provided to faculty-transcending research programmes, who decides on how they are spent, and how do we organise employee participation in the allocation of the funds?

    These questions are exacerbated by the fact that universities have recently begun to work together in alliances, where education and research are jointly organised. We see this at national level[4], and also at European level.[5]

    In short, there are quite a few issues in the area of classical, formal, representative democracy. A related issue, alongside the perceived reduction of the significance of formal co-determination, is the autonomy of professionals within the university is also severely restricted by rules and procedures limiting their own sphere of decision-making. According to some, the university has even become extremely hierarchical[6], which can have negative consequences for employee workloads, job satisfaction, commitment, and ultimately, the quality of their work. It is not inconceivable that such a constellation of issues also affects their willingness to engage in formal participation.

    Both issues are addressed in this chapter. First of all, the formal power and participation, which mainly focuses on strategy and the corresponding allocation of budgets, as is the case within universities and faculties. Then, there is also the issue of the role of and opportunity for professionals, teachers, and researchers, as well as students, to make decisions around the content of education and research. In the field of education, the curriculum committees serve as a special hybrid form here; on the one hand, they are institutions for formally regulated, legally anchored, representative participation. On the other hand, they are the primary place where teachers and students can freely discuss the quality of education and quality assurance from the perspective of their own professionalism and autonomy.

    Before outlining future perspectives, we will briefly examine the history of university organisation, governance, and participation bodies. This will show that it also reflects external and internal developments. This summary will also clarify where some of the current problems originate from.

    A brief history

    Even until well after World War II, decision-making within universities was relatively simple. It was the individual professors who made independent decisions about their education and research (to the extent that they did any). Matters of common interest were discussed in the faculty professors’ meeting, or in the senate at university level, together with all of the university professors. The senate was chaired by the Rector Magnificus, a position that rotated annually. The senate mainly dealt with internal academic affairs. There was also a board of trustees, consisting of administrators whose main duties were elsewhere in society, supplemented by the mayor. The trustees represented the university externally and were responsible for the resources (financial and otherwise). For example, if matters had to be arranged with the municipality regarding construction or accommodations, it was arranged by the board of trustees.[7] In all this, we should remember that public universities were administrative units of the Ministry of Education until 1963.[8] Only in that year were they given their own legal personality, allowing them to operate independently in legal affairs and to make (fairly) independent decisions about their financial resources. But they then also became independently liable for their actions. This did not mean that from then on universities had their hands completely free, though. For years to come, intrusive budget discussions continued between individual universities and the Ministry.[9],[10] Important strategic decisions were determined in The Hague, and the Ministry kept a significant finger in the pie when it came to personnel policy. The right to appoint professors was in the hands of the Crown until 1986. The ministry also determined the number of professors, and the number of assistant and associate professors that a professor could appoint.[11]

    The governance model outlined above, which did not allow for participation and co-determination of staff and students, proved unsustainable as student numbers rose dramatically in the second half of the 1960s, partly as a result of a post-World War II baby boom. The composition of that student population also changed, as students from lower- and middle-class backgrounds began to enrol.[12] This necessarily led to a growth in the number of employees, diversification of academic activities, expansion of the bureaucratic apparatus and also to a call for new forms of governance.[13],[14] Specifically, forms of governance in which non-professorial staff and students could exert their influence.

    When outlining the history of university governance and democracy, the moment that usually comes up is the 1969 occupation of the Maagdenhuis building at the University of Amsterdam (UvA). It has certainly reached legendary proportions in the national media. But, as the Utrecht historian Hans Righart has described, the Maagdenhuis occupation was perhaps more of a good-natured parody of the profound student uprisings the year before in the United States, Germany, and France (especially Paris); the real starting shot for the wave of democratisation at Dutch universities was not fired in the capital, but in Tilburg. After dramatic protests and occupations by students, the administration there completely reversed course by accepting the principle of co-determination without reservations, to discuss the new culture of governance together with every level of the university. In response, the Dutch House of Representatives insisted on quick governance changes at the university, and Minister Veringa was open to the idea. Only then did protests arise at other universities, including the UvA.[15]

    By 1970, Minister Veringa introduced the University Governance Reform Act (WUB), which gave ample scope for student and employee participation. But not only that: the governance of and within the university was also drastically changed. The Board of Trustees and the Senate were abolished, for example. In their place came an Executive Board, with a seat set aside for the Rector Magnificus. Governance within the university was modelled to a large extent on that of the area communities of municipalities, provinces, and the national government. The WUB assumed that there were three communities within the university, namely university, faculty, and department. Three constituencies were also distinguished within the university: academic staff, non-academic staff, and students. They began to influence policy via elected representations in councils, which were composed on the basis of elections, where - salient detail - the respective section lost seats if the turnout was less than 35%.

    In this model, power lays mainly with the departments, which determined the curriculum and research programmes. Powers of organisation and coordination mainly fell to the faculty. The professorial meetings of the past were abolished. In their place, the Faculty Council became the most important governing body. The council also nominated candidates for professors’ appointments. The University Council was entrusted with regulation and administration of the university as a whole, insofar as they were not explicitly assigned to the Executive Board by law. Otherwise, the Executive Board functioned as the day-to-day administration.[16]

    Over the years, the implementation of the WUB proved rather problematic from two angles. There was a frequent competitive battle and enormous attention to detail, stimulated in part by the fact that councils had the right of amendment, leading to lengthy, even nightly, meetings.[17] This, combined with the widespread concern for societal conditions and injustices elsewhere in the world[18],[19] - to which the solution often could not be found within the confines of the university - made effective governance almost impossible. That became more problematic as the university’s environment became increasingly complex. For example, research funding was moved from direct government funding and had to be partly ‘retrieved’ from the funds made available by the Organisatie voor Zuiver Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (Organisation for Pure Scientific Research (ZWO)), and after 1988 from its successor the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO, which had even more funds to distribute). To be clear, these were resources that had just been taken away from universities. On top of that, the government also became more and more directive. The duration of studies was limited through the Two Phases Structure Act. An extremely painful operation called ‘Selective Shrinkage and Growth’ was launched via a memorandum titled ‘Task Sharing and Concentration’, which led to the closure of numerous programmes nationwide. Largely driven by the desire for austerity, government policy became increasingly activist and far-reaching.[20]

    To address two major objections to the WUB system - lack of administrative power and little room for independent operation - the Modernisation of Administrative Organisation Act was passed in 1997. This had some major consequences, but we will limit ourselves to a few main points. In order to promote the autonomy of universities, supervisory boards were set up, tasked with overseeing strategy and finances instead of the Minister. The Minister retained some indirect influence, however, through the right of appointment of Supervisory Board members. But the Supervisory Board was clearly portrayed as a body that had to function for the benefit of the university, and not as the Minister’s pawn.[21],[22],[23]

    The internal organisation also underwent a drastic change. The position of Executive Board and the deans was strengthened, but above all clarified. From the MUB onwards, it was clear who governs, and who primarily has the role of participation body. It was now clear that the councils at the various levels were no longer co-managers, let alone in charge. Universities were also given the choice of instituting ‘undivided’ participation bodies, i.e. a university council in which all constituencies have a seat, or for ‘divided’ participation, in which staff have a separate position in accordance with the Works Councils Act. At the very lowest level, the MUB also tried to do something about the quality of the primary processes. The departments were abolished and, in order to delegate more responsibility in the curriculum, study programme management was introduced alongside the associated programme committee, consisting of teachers and students from the relevant programme, whose task was to monitor the quality of the relevant programme(s).

    The MUB thus reduced the dominance of staff and students through the councils. Powers were generally watered down to advisory rights. It was clear that student representatives in particular were not very enthusiastic about this change.[24] The question soon arose whether the legislator had not gone too far in limiting the councils’ powers. In 2010, this led to the Improved Governance (Higher Education) Act, giving the councils the right of consent on the main points of the budget. The Enhanced Governance Powers Act of 2017 gave the education committee the right of consent on elements of the Education and Examination Regulations (EER).[25],[26] It also strengthened the involvement of the participation bodies in the appointment of administrators, especially the Executive Board members.[27]

    In 2021, the Enhanced Governance Powers Act was re-evaluated. According to the cabinet, employee and student participation was doing rather well, in general. But this was followed by a number of critical notes that significantly undermined that general picture. These included a lack of knowledge among the employee participation bodies about statutory tasks and powers; cooperation between the various employee participation bodies could be improved; the study programme committees were not prominent enough; the employee participation bodies do not consult enough with their constituencies; and participation in elections showed a declining trend.[28]

    Core issues

    Two-sided problem

    We have outlined how the organisation of the university, and in particular its control and participation, has been subject to constant changes under the pressure of internal and external circumstances over the past few decades. This has not eliminated the need for new adjustments. This was already evident from the conclusion of the paragraph. If we look from a somewhat higher level of abstraction at the kind of issues that will require solutions in the future, we have to conclude that there are two major participation issues, which are to some degree interrelated and need to be addressed together.

    First, there is a question of formal control and participation. Who makes the key decisions now? Who is the ‘boss’? Or rather, who are the bosses? On the administrators’ side, there seem to be the fewest questions, but new questions constantly arise on the participation side. Exactly what powers do the employee and student participation bodies have? What do they get to have a say in? And what are the relationships between the participation bodies like? A major point of frustration among participation bodies is that they are apparently not sufficiently visible, and are certainly not perceived as valuable or important, as turnout in elections is low and generically declining.

    It has been suggested that the declining interest in participation is in part due to the fact that the university organisation has become increasingly corporate in recent decades. The MUB is also often cited as a culprit here, according to Dorsman and Knegtmans. This law, which gave greater power to faculty deans and executive boards, is said to have been a radical break with traditional collective decision-making in universities.[29] The question is whether the introduction of the MUB, or at least its implementation in practice, was not so much the cause but a consequence of a series of developments, such as the strong growth in numbers of students, a government that is withdrawing in terms of funding, the need to tap into external sources of money, and the more production-oriented education and publishing culture[30], which together have led to a drastic change in management. This corresponds with an analysis by Van der Zwaan, who indicated that there is a core question with which many large organisations struggle, and which plays out at the individual level: ‘Am I still seen and appreciated?’ Identification with a modern university is apparently much more difficult than it used to be, according to Van der Zwaan.[31] But determining one’s own place and role within the university is also perceived as problematic. What room is left for the professional autonomy of teachers and researchers? The prevailing corporate culture is seen as a threat here, and that, in turn, affects perceived workloads and job satisfaction.

    Both issues are dissected in a bit more detail below. First, we will examine issues related to formal employee and student participation. Then we will look at the scope for exercising professional autonomy within the university organisation.

    Formal control and participation

    Participation in representative bodies

    Turnout in elections continues to decline. In political science, electoral turnout is considered an important indicator of the legitimacy of the representative body and, indirectly, of decision-making within a political/administrative system.[32] If we follow that premise, university democracy is in a very bad state. The 1970s count as the heyday of university democracy, with average turnout rates of staff in academic positions, staff in non-academic positions and students of respectively 61%, 52% and 42%. By the mid-1990s, they were between 56% and 36%.[33] But numbers declined steadily in the years that followed.[34] Today, many breathe a sigh of relief when turnout exceeds 30%. But that is rarely the case. In 2022, turnout in student body elections reached a dismal low. In Utrecht, turnout was only 11 percent.[35]

    Besides exercising the right to vote, utilising the right to stand for election is also a major issue. It is increasingly difficult to find suitable candidates for the various participation bodies. This certainly applies to the staff delegation. For the quality and authority of a university council and faculty council, it is vital that key figures from the staff, including professors, are represented.[36]

    Nationalisation and pace of decision-making

    An issue that is extremely complicated not only for the university management, but also especially for the participation bodies, is the relatively large amounts of specific resources made available by the central government in recent years, which must also be deployed at very short notice. Examples include the National Education Resources Programme (NPO), to address the consequences of the pandemic, but also the sector plan funds[37], and in particular the large amounts made available by the National Growth Fund.[38] There is no doubt that these funds are not only welcome, even vital in order to eliminate backlogs, to establish a sound financial basis for education and research, and to spark much-desired innovation. But the short lead times with which these funds always become available lead to some serious problems. First of all, it is almost impossible to deploy the allocated resources on specific expenditures, with the greatest possible effectiveness. Secondly, university boards are sometimes faced with the fact that external parties organise processes that sometimes interfere with a well-thought-out university strategy. And thirdly, as a result of the time constraints, participation bodies often have insufficient time to make a meaningful contribution to the internal allocation of resources. This state of affairs is extremely frustrating for both the administration and participation bodies.

    Education and research extend beyond the university’s existing structures

    There are also other, long-standing developments that raise questions about the organisation of university democracy. For example, research and education activities are increasingly being organised across the boundaries of disciplines and faculties. This requires a re-thinking of the employee and student participation structures. Which programme committees are responsible for quality control in multi- and interdisciplinary programmes? Which faculty councils should be involved in starting or ending such programmes? And what if they disagree with each other? Some similar questions arise in research. If research funds are provided to faculty-transcending research programmes, who decides on how they are spent, and how do we organise participation in the allocation of the funds?

    The key question above all is: are the communities originally defined by the WUB still relevant? A new community structure has emerged around education, transcending old departmental/research group/faculty structures. Faculties increasingly seem to be developing into capacity providers for work that extends beyond the faculty in varying contexts.

    Internationalisation

    A development that is certainly also relevant to the (quality) of control and participation is the increasing degree of internationalisation. Universities have a growing number of international staff and students. They should be part of our community (or communities), and should therefore also be able to influence decision-making, and thus also participate in governance. But this raises the issue of language. If we communicate in Dutch, almost all foreign students and employees will be excluded from participation. But a complete switch to the use of English, as some universities have done (e.g. Twente), makes participation less accessible to Dutch staff and students who are less proficient in the language. The quality of our communication also suffers. Utrecht has therefore opted for principled bilingualism, including the use of listening language.[39]

    Self-determination in the context of professional autonomy

    The past decades have undeniably seen a much greater focus on operations within universities. This is somewhat understandable; universities have grown in terms of student numbers, but government funding has not kept pace. Universities therefore went searching for additional sources of funding, partly stimulated by the government embracing the idea of the ‘entrepreneurial university’, which was very quickly placed in the context of economic-financial valorisation. Valorisation, in the sense of harnessing scientific knowledge for economic and social applications, was even declared an official core task of universities in 2004.[40],[41] But since then, valorisation has become a very loaded term. We prefer to use the term ‘societal impact’, because within the university world, purely generating ‘economic benefit’ as a university objective does not enjoy widespread support.[42],[43],[44]

    These developments in the Netherlands and abroad had major consequences for universities’ internal functioning. Inadequate government funding forced us to find ways to improve efficiency, which in turn led to economies of scale and centralisation.[45] External financiers added new forms of accountability. The government also tightened the reins in the area of accountability, spurred on by the Dutch House of Representatives, and especially the Court of Audit. This is a general trend, prompted perhaps in part by the New Public Management ideology, which was widely embraced in the wake of the dominant neoliberal tendency over the past few decades.[46],[47] This accountability craze has become even more pronounced in special forms of funding, such as quality assurance funding and NPO funding. The Minister still aimed to give institutions room to manoeuvre on the basis of trust and the constitutional freedom of education, and to suffice with regular reporting in the annual report. But the Court of Audit insisted on specific audits of the subsidy conditions, and on the submission of separate policy information by the institutions, to limit risks and to gain better insight into the effectiveness of the funds that were spent.[48]

    The incessant growth of accountability obligations led to universities hiring more and more people who were not engaged in the primary processes of education and research[49] - often referred to as ‘bureaucracy’.[50] And that, in turn, reduced the amount of money that could ultimately be spent on education and research.

    The scarcity of financial resources then made itself felt within the education and research domains in various ways, most immediately, perhaps, in education. If the government is only prepared to finance students for a standard study duration, then every student who takes longer to graduate is a burden. Any extra time spent on such a student would be a waste at the expense of other students, who are willing or able to study at the set pace. That, in turn, can affect the quality of education, and in the worst case, the quality of degrees. Not surprisingly, universities wanted to gain more insight into and control over the return on their investments. But this also led to more reporting and accountability obligations for university teachers, and consequently a sense of loss of professional autonomy.

    In the field of research, finding sources of external funding has become the driving force. This is true in general, whether the funding comes from the government or businesses. But it applies in particular to funding sources perceived as dominant and prestigious for individual career prospects, such as NWO and ERC grants. The allocation of this funding is often determined thematically, with the result that we find that certain researchers, issues, and disciplines are less likely to receive funding. And for those who did stand a chance of receiving these grants, certain metrics were the dominant yardsticks for awarding funding until very recently.[51] All of this resulted in a certain culture of publication and assessment that not only limited the space for setting one’s own research agendas, but also created an academic king-of-the-hill contest; the one who had brought in the most and the highest awards sat at the top and was seen as the leader whose example had to be followed. Within the research domain, these developments led to feelings of loss of autonomy, increased workloads, but sometimes also to feelings of unsafety. Leadership culture has been identified as a contributing factor to all of this.[52],[53]

    The difference in external incentives helped to make it seem only logical to separate education and research entirely within the university organisation, whereas they had previously been kept together, mainly within the departments. This separation disregards that the university distinguishes itself from all other educational institutions through the intertwining of education and research.[54] University education is characterised by the latest knowledge and insights and learning how to acquire them. Education and research at the university also stem from the same basic attitude: the curiosity to understand the unknown; to grasp it in images, words, or sentences; and to make the newly acquired knowledge and insights understandable to oneself as well as to others.[55]

    This organisational division has had major consequences, at least for university HR policy and the relationships between staff members. As careers were mainly built along the line of research performance, education for many became a ‘burden’ that you had to ‘buy out of’ if at all possible. To overstate: for a long time, education became work for the ‘youngest clerks’, who took on the bulk of the work on temporary contracts, without time for research. It was easy to predict that this would create dissatisfaction among teachers, and that it would affect the quality of academic education. Fortunately, people have paid more attention to this discrepancy in recent years, and some necessary improvements have been made. But the key question is whether we should not be creating a lot more ties between the organisation of education and research.

    Possible solutions for the university of the future

    Introduction

    If we want to facilitate the desired developments envisaged in the previous chapters, then we will have to find a solution to some of the problems described above. Real, effective solutions can only be found if they are in line with the essence of the university. That essence has also ensured the university’s survival as an institution over the centuries that followed its birth a millennium ago. Especially in democratic states governed by the rule of law, there is no doubt about the justification for an institution that independently gathers knowledge and brings it back to society, either directly or indirectly, through education and research (sometimes after a long time). But the university can only fulfil this role well if its core players - the teachers, researchers and, in their footsteps, the students - have sufficient autonomy to gather and disseminate this new knowledge. The future of the university therefore lies in a return to the past. But mind you, only a partial return to the past, because professional autonomy can no longer be seen as something that manifests itself primarily at the individual level. As we outlined in the previous chapters, education and research have increasingly become team achievements. It is in those teams that a ‘sense of belonging’, of involvement and identification, should emerge. From there, we can consider how we can organise formal control and participation to better enable the performance of our primary tasks from within the team.

    Professionals more at the helm again: connected professionalism

    Overall, the recent academic literature on organisations has frequently dealt with reducing workloads and restoring enjoyment of work by making it more satisfying and meaningful. The work of Laloux has been especially ground-breaking in this regard.[56] The core of his solution lies in radically reducing hierarchy and providing more, much more, space for self-management.[57] Such an idea fits nicely with the university’s organisational foundation: professional autonomy. Before we elaborate on this idea in the context of the university organisation of the future, let us first focus on the concept of professional autonomy within the university, because there are quite a few misunderstandings about it.[58] As is often the case in this book, we do not use the word ‘recover’ or ‘restore’ to mean a blind return to old situations, but rather a search for new forms - in this case, new forms of professional autonomy. The idea of hybrid professionalism[59], as formulated by Mirko Noordegraaf, is appropriate here. To Noordegraaf, professionalism is linked to a well-managed organisational environment. Conflicting professional and managerial principles, such as autonomy and control, or quality and efficiency, are combined to create contemporary, professional activities. Noordegraaf describes ‘connective professionalism’[60], where there is a connected and dialogical relationship between the organisation and the professional, as the most far-reaching form of realignment. We will go into the tension between professional autonomy and working together to accomplish a mission in more detail below, along with what they mean for our vision of the future university.

    The professional autonomy of academics in their teaching and research is often - and justly - mentioned in the same breath as the term ‘academic freedom’. This means that academics are free to choose their topic and report on their research and education as they see fit, of course based on recognised scientific and methodological insights. Why is academic freedom so important? According to Kinzelbach et al., this freedom is essential for high-quality education and research, is the driver of innovation, strengthens the capacity of academics and students to acquire and generate knowledge, and therefore also protects society’s capacity for self-reflection.[61] Academic freedom also implies a special responsibility: namely, to perform one’s work according to scientific standards. KU Leuven’s Rector, Luc Sels, formulated this clearly in his speech at the opening of the 2021-2022 academic year.[62] Professional standards and values must be respected. In the Netherlands, the 2018 Code of Conduct on Scientific Integrity is the primary example. Within that code, the essence of norm 53 is especially crucial: be clear and honest about the limitations of one’s expertise. But in addition to these ethical restrictions, academic freedom is also limited in another way. As we mentioned above, university staff works within institutions that have policies for education and research. Education is subject to education- and examination regulations. Scarce resources are allocated in a targeted manner. Dutch courts have recognised the authority of institutions to impose such restrictions.[63] But universities also bear a special responsibility there. After all, academics and institutions around the world have acknowledged that academic freedom has an institutional and organisational dimension. This has a protective aspect, in the sense that governments must respect the autonomy of higher education institutions. But also a responsibility aspect, in that university institutions in turn must, in the words of the KNAW: “ensure that university boards have the responsibility not to interfere in education and research any more than is reasonable with a view to promoting good academic practice”.[64] Of course, what is ‘reasonable’ is open to debate, and that debate, aimed at finding support among academics, should take place openly within the institution. That debate is of course stimulated in part by the layered structure of the university organisation, where, pursuant to Article 9.15 HRA, the deans have primary responsibility for the organisation and programming of education and research. The professors, in turn, are primarily responsible for the development of their assigned field of science and the associated education (Article 9.19, second paragraph, HRA).[65]

    We have one final comment on the topic of education. One aspect of academic freedom is that the university teacher determines the content and method of the education to be provided. But this freedom is not unlimited, because education is a team effort, with teachers offering a coherent curriculum in close consultation with each other, with students, experts, and the professional field. Legally, this is an important responsibility of the programme committees, whose task it is to safeguard and promote the quality of education, and to advise the education director and the dean on the education and examination regulations (EER), and on all other matters concerning education within the programme (Art. 9.18 WHW).

    Given this context of professional autonomy, the move towards more team science, and modern insights into the functioning of organisations, it is clear that much more responsibility needs to be delegated to teams. Ideally, they should be given their own budgets, and corresponding responsibilities to achieve their goals. Those goals are largely self-formulated but must of course fit into the bigger picture of the missions of faculties and the university. Teams are given control over their own personnel policy, including the appointment of new employees. Primary quality control measures are also placed in the hands of the teams; after all, they are also charged with realising the goals they have set. So, they will have to be accountable for them too, because with responsibility comes accountability. And, contrary to what some people may claim, accountability does not automatically imply hierarchy.[66] Hierarchy manifests itself through direct management and the need to comply.

    Of course, all this will entail a rather radical shift of responsibilities. Centralised rules and procedures should be limited to matters that affect the core and commonality of the organisation; for example, the internal audit and HR policies. Of course, collective labour agreements must be respected, but the responsibility to do so will be decentralised. As a result, central departments will take on a more detached advisory role and can be reduced in size. University and faculty administrators should be restrained in making decisions, setting rules, and establishing procedures; subsidiarity is explicit in this. They too will shift more into the role of supervisor or advisor.[67] They will also, perhaps even more than now, have to encourage all kinds of informal consultation and contact between the different parts of the university organisation, in order to make the organisation a continuous learning organisation.

    The definition of the ‘teams’ is of course crucial in this. The faculties play a decisive role in this, because legally it is the faculty, and especially the dean, who bears responsibility for the organisation and programming of education and research. If we take this appeal for professional autonomy seriously, the faculties should not go much beyond setting general substantive frameworks and allocating budgets and (initial) staff capacity.

    A university’s range of tasks is complex, and unlike an organisation like Buurtzorg, where self-management has been a proven model for many years, these tasks cannot be accommodated by fairly uniform units.[68] As discussed in the chapter on ‘Community’, university employees will often be part of multiple teams, but it is imperative that faculties ensure that employees do not fall into impassable chasms in terms of loyalties and responsibilities. So, it is important that employees only participate in a limited number of teams, which combine education and research as much as possible.

    As mentioned, universities have become more complex organisations in recent decades. This is partly due to the fact that education, and certainly research, has become increasingly Europeanised and internationalised. Coordination and support from the faculty level will continue to be needed. The same applies to the (policy) intervention mechanisms and forms of (covert) supervision that will undoubtedly continue to descend on universities from the national government, such as audits and investigations by the Court of Audit. University administrators are constantly being asked whether they are ‘in control’. As a result, the scope for organising self-management and exercising professional autonomy are sometimes severely restricted.[69] We can only loosen those restrictions if national politicians were to look at the functioning of universities more on the basis of trust. But we should not expect them to start ‘letting go in trust’ anytime soon. The political- and media culture is not up for it at the moment. The political landscape is increasingly fragmented, and all those parties want to gain publicity, they want to ‘score’. The same kind of fragmentation is manifested in the (social) media. In the process, politics and media have become mutually reinforcing partners in manufacturing distrust. Universities and individual academics, who often have significant influence on policy initiatives, are therefore an attractive target of attention. This tide of reinforcing and swelling distrust will not easily be turned. Naturally, we must continue to work on it anyway, with a view to our employees’ welfare and workload and the quality expertise universities can deliver. That is also precisely why university and faculty administrators will have to monitor, and where possible expand, the scope for self-management.

    Administrators can - and will – also have a role to play when it comes to employee participation in cross-team processes. For instance, the drafting of sector funding plans has so far mainly been a matter for a few individuals, even though they require a lot of time to prepare. Time that could also be used to involve more researchers, to let them think along and participate in decisions.

    Whatever the case, in the university of the future there will have to be more room for self-management, and therefore for the utilization of professional autonomy. If university employees are able and allowed to manage themselves through teams, we can expect that they will also become more aware of the bodies in which the preconditions for their performance are set and will likely also develop more enthusiasm for taking part in the participation bodies that share responsibility for laying down some of those preconditions. The chapter on Community already mentioned the importance of (promoting) ‘organisational citizenship behaviours’, in which employees voluntarily take extra steps that have a positive effect on the atmosphere within the organisation, but also on its effectiveness.[70] Such behaviour does not arise spontaneously on a large scale. The preconditions for it must first be created, including by making room and placing greater reliance on self-management. And on a larger scale, this can even contribute to strengthening and deepening university democracy, as we have outlined above.

    Strengthening of formal participation

    Formal employee and student participation can only function well if it is fully nurtured from the bottom to the top of the entire university community. The previous section outlined what needs to be done to achieve that situation in the future. But other proposals have also been made in the (recent) past to strengthen employee and student participation. Some of these potential solutions are discussed below.[71]

    Reinforcement within the current system

    Of course, there is still room for improvement within the existing system. For example, by improving support, more training, more commitment, and resources for communication with constituencies. Even better solutions can be devised for the required time and effort, including more guaranteed time allowances for staff and adequate monetary allowances for students, which would make it more attractive to take a seat in the participation bodies.[72] In line with this, filling positions in the participation bodies could be given a greater weight in the context of Recognition and Rewards.

    One option for strengthening student influence that has so far remained virtually unused is the appointment of a student consultant, also known as an ‘assessor’. This option has been advocated for since at least the re-evaluation of the MUB.[73] There is a proven track record for the position at the faculty level, for which the function is even enshrined in law (Art. 9.12(2) WHW). But at central level, many universities appear apprehensive about direct student involvement in decision-making.[74]

    One persistent problem is the short-cycle nature of university participation bodies. People often complain about national politics not looking much further ahead than four years, i.e. to the next elections. In university councils, terms are even shorter; students only sit for one year. Despite all the well-intentioned introduction efforts, one year is far too short to master the increasingly complicated decision-making processes, especially those regarding the budget, let alone to bend them to your will. This has at least two consequences. For one, the influence of participation bodies, especially the bodies for students, is less than optimal. A second effect is a strong focus on a limited number of shorter-term objectives, and less attention for long-term policy. Apart from the legal and regulatory terms, this short office term is also partly the result of habits; students go full steam ahead for one year, and then they go on to do other things. It might be more logical for the position to be held part-time but for a longer period, allowing knowledge and experience to be accumulated and applied over time.

    The programme committees deserve some special attention. As we explained in Chapter 4.2, they play a crucial role in safeguarding and promoting the quality of education. The legislator sees it as a joint responsibility of both teachers and students. The programme committee should also discuss the content of the curriculum, obviously with due observance of the special responsibility borne by teachers and dealt with above. These discussions, for instance about the inclusiveness of the curriculum, and the issues regarding the educational materials to be used in the individual subjects, now seem to take place only on occasion. This can only improve structurally if students are given more responsibility for their own learning process and can actually contribute to the content of education through co-creation. The chapter on Education explains how we see this as the way forward in education, in terms of content. We therefore expect it to have a positive impact on employee and student participation as well.

    Reintroducing the Senate?

    With a kind of nostalgic longing for a history that never actually existed, but certainly cannot be transported to today’s reality, there are regular calls for the return of the Academic Senate.[75],[76] The idea behind this is mainly that the executive boards have become too far removed from the primary processes, that the university has become far too hierarchical, and that academics should mainly govern themselves. It is a plea that is very reminiscent of the discourses of the former rector of the University of Leuven, Rik Torfs, who strongly disapproves of what he calls ‘professional administrators, who come in from all corners of society’.[77] In the Netherlands, by the way, this situation has long since ceased to hold true. In recent years, not only the rectors, but also most other members of the executive boards, have been recruited from the academic ranks. This certainly applies to the chairpersons.

    Apart from that issue, we certainly see the need for organising more self-governance and more reliance on professional autonomy. However, the question is whether the return of a senate could actually help revitalise democracy in the university, put the academic community back at the helm of decision-making, and therefore contribute to the legitimacy of decision-making. A decision-making body consisting mainly of professors, as F. Cohen seems to advocate,[78] would not be acceptable in the current times. It also would not be practicable, in administrative terms. This was already apparent in the post-war period; the senate was simply far too large to take decisive action.[79],[80] Representatives of WOinActie also argue for the return of the senate. But in order to promote legitimacy and to keep it workable, they propose that only elected representatives of academics, students and support staff should have a seat in the senate. How this differs from the undivided University Council as we know it now is not clear. What is clear, however, is that WOinActie does not really want to go back to the past, and above all wants to have representation that is diverse and inclusive.[81] But how a reborn senate can achieve this, remains completely unclear. For the time being, it seems to make more sense to make the existing participation bodies more diverse and inclusive. That would require more grassroot support, as discussed in detail in Chapter 4.2.

    Direct democracy

    One solution that has been put forward in recent years, especially by WOinActie, is the direct election of administrators, especially the rector.[82] These voices often refer to similar situations abroad. Indeed, in many foreign countries, but not all, the rector is the head of the university.[83],[84] But such an idea has never gained a foothold in the Netherlands, which is very fond of collegial governance, including in universities.[85] It would therefore be odd in the Dutch context to start directly electing the rector. That would only be different if rectors could assemble their own university management team, and there would not be - as is now the case within the Executive Board - two administrators who have their own independent positions. Within the current legal and administrative context, a direct election of the rector can really only lead to discomfort and dissatisfaction. In that context, it is worth looking back at experiences with mayoral referendums that we had in the Netherlands for a short period from 2001, and which were abolished again in 2009 due to very low turnouts.[86]

    But suppose we do change that legal context, and actually make the rector ‘the boss’ of the university: could the direct election of the rector strengthen the democratic legitimacy of decision-making? Foreign experience shows there are serious doubts about that. Reports from abroad indicate that rector elections often lead to major divisions within the university community and it often takes years to heal the wounds and take steps forward again along substantive lines.[87] In any case, one can naturally question whether the election of a single leader of an organisation, be it a university or a state, is desirable. Ideally, it would result in a broad base of support. But more often today we see that winner-takes-all elections result in divisions in the community and the election of people with risky character traits.[88]

    Another possibility, of course, is to make certain decisions within universities the subject of direct democracy. Given the context of the current WHW, this would involve the use of a consultative, non-binding referendum on the initiative of the council or the representation bodies. This has the same advantages and disadvantages as we have had with similar referendums at local and national levels. The use of referendums has always been a matter of debate there too. Initially, the proponents were mainly those who advocated expanding democracy. In the Netherlands, they could mainly be found among the supporters of the leftish parties D66 and GroenLinks. Now, supporters are mainly found among people who criticise the established political order and want to bend it to their will.[89] All this has led to endless wrangling in the Netherlands around the introduction, abolition, and reintroduction of referendums, under all kinds of procedural safeguards and constructions.[90] A new attempt to introduce a binding referendum stranded again in 2022.[91]

    The divisions that exist around the introduction of referendums - in addition to all kinds of other motives, such as fear of erosion of representative democracy - are based in part on the divisions that referendums often create in terms of outcomes. Of course, referendums can increase involvement in decisions, but they also often create opposition, and discomfort about the meaning of the outcomes, especially if there is a low turnout. This is because a referendum mainly exposes divisions and is not primarily aimed at promoting and expressing the commonality of the target community that is the university, reflected in its decisions. Combined with the low turnouts in referendums we have had so far in the Netherlands, it is highly questionable whether introducing referendums would promote the quality of democracy within universities. Perhaps it would be different if every referendum was preceded by substantive conversation and debate, so that the final numerical decision would be additionally legitimised by the preceding process.[92]

    Deliberative democracy

    The issue of declining trust in politics and governance and declining turnouts is widespread and is certainly not limited to the Netherlands. In that light of dissatisfaction with the functioning of representative democracy as it exists today, there has been a growing interest in the theory and practice of so-called deliberative democracy.[93] This is a form of public decision-making centred around information gathering and exchanges of arguments with and by citizens. Deliberative democracy promises a more reliable and legitimate form of political authority, better informed decisions, and a more active exercise of citizenship.[94] There has been considerable attention to this phenomenon in academia for some time.[95] That attention received a major ‘boost’ in 2013, with the publication of David Van Reybrouck’s pamphlet titled: ‘Tegen verkiezingen’ (Against elections).[96],[97],[98],[99],[100]

    These are forms of deliberative democracy more commonly known by designations such as ‘citizens forum’, ‘citizens summit’ or ‘citizens jury’.[101] A citizens’ forum can take many forms but, at its core, it consists of a randomly assembled group of citizens who come together to deliberate on a particular issue, involving a policy agenda or a choice of specific policy options.[102] Over a number of days, weeks, or even months, participants are exposed to information, and hear witnesses selected for being experts on a particular topic or as representatives of the interests affected by a potential decision. Through trained moderators aimed at ensuring fair procedures, forum members are given the opportunity to hear the witnesses, and to request new information and new witnesses. After a process of deliberation, members make a decision or recommendation. The body that set up the citizens’ forum (minister, chamber, municipal council) is expected to respond to the outcomes, either by acting accordingly or by explaining why it disagrees with them.

    Much experience has since been gained internationally, locally, nationally, and internationally, ranging from minor to very large issues, such as preventing another financial crisis (Iceland 2012), legalising same-sex marriage (Ireland 2015), the need to tackle climate change (UK 2020, France 2021), or the future of the EU (2022, etc.).[103]

    Forms of deliberative democracy can play important roles in the development of ‘active citizenship’. They make it possible to bring experiences and opinions into the public domain that often remain excluded from it, thereby also enhancing the quality of decision-making. Where a citizens’ forum is set up and the responsible public bodies actually respond to it (whether positively or negatively), and actively process the results, the democratic legitimacy of the decision-making process is enhanced. But they also present a significant risk. If policymakers only engage in ‘cherry-picking’, allowing largely unpopular decisions to be validated by these kinds of forums, or only selectively shop around in the recommendations, it only increases distrust in politics and politicians.[104]

    Deliberative democracy has the potential to contribute to strengthening legitimacy of decision-making because - in Cohen’s words - it offers a perspective essentially different from a democracy that functions on the basis of elections:

    “Whereas elections exist by the grace of creating, and even magnifying differences[105], a deliberative democracy emphasises what members of a community have in common.” [106],[107]

    This is certainly not to say that we can simply replace the old system of representative democracy, including in universities, with forms of deliberative democracy. It is more an encouragement to think about how we can strengthen the legitimacy of decision-making. It therefore seems interesting to explore forms of deliberative democracy to find solutions, as well as to reinforce democratic legitimacy for solutions in areas that universities have been working on, or even struggling with, for some time. Several issues come to mind, including codes of conduct for social safety, the desirability of education-oriented careers, the core and purpose of the curriculum, and so forth.

    Conclusion

    The university has become an extraordinarily complex institution since World War II. There has been a dramatic growth in numbers of staff and students, whose origins have also changed fundamentally, and who, above all, have become much more diverse. There have also been many changes in terms of finance; university budgets have risen sharply as a result of the influx of students. But financial complexity has also increased, mainly because research funds largely have to be raised from numerous external financiers, such as ERC, NWO and the central government’s various initiatives, such as the sector plans and the National Growth Fund. These all impose their own different conditions, with the result that parts of university personnel policy have actually been externalised. All this means that university decision-making processes have also become much more complicated. As we have seen above, the legislature has tried to accommodate us in that. Much has changed in the areas of control and in the organisation of participation over the past few decades. But all these changes are not enough to make the university ‘fit for the future’. Due to, in part, external developments, the university and its people have become too wedged in by rules, procedures and accountability processes, which now present risks for the well-being of professionals and the quality of their work. There is a need to start making more room for university staff and students’ own responsibility again. This is not a complete return to the past, as the necessary changes in organisation and participation will take place in the context of Open Science, giving professional autonomy very different landmarks than in the past.

    1. Burkens, M. C., Kummeling, H. R. B. M., Uzman, J., Vermeulen, B. P. & Widdershoven, R. J. G. M. (2022). Beginselen van de Democratische Rechtsstaat (p. 217). Kluwer. ↑

    2. Burkens, M. C., Kummeling, H. R. B. M., Uzman, J., Vermeulen, B. P. & Widdershoven, R. J. G. M. (2022). Beginselen van de Democratische Rechtsstaat (p. 330). Kluwer. ↑

    3. Van Gunsteren, H. (2006). Vertrouwen in Democratie. Van Gennep. ↑

    4. See also the alliance between Eindhoven University of Technology, Wageningen University & Research, Utrecht University and University Medical Centre Utrecht (EWUU), and their website: ewuu.nl; or the alliance between Leiden University, TU Delft and Erasmus University Rotterdam (LDE), see: leiden-delft-erasmus.nl. A similar development was strongly recommended in the following advisory memo: Veerman, C. P., Berdahl, R. M., Bormans, M. J. G., Geven, K. M., Hazelkorn, E., Rinnooy Kan, A. H. G., Niekerk, W. A. & Vossensteyn, J. J. (2010). Differentiëren in drievoud: omwille van de kwaliteit en verscheidenheid in het hoger onderwijs: Advies van de Commissie Toekomstbestendig Hoger Onderwijs Stelsel. Commissie Toekomstbestendig Hoger Onderwijs Stelsel. ris.utwente.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/5146538/adv-cie-toekomstbestendig-ho.pdf ↑

    5. Especially in the context of the European Universities Initiative (initially also known as the ‘Macron networks’): education.ec.eu ↑

    6. Bod, R. Breuker, R. & Robeijns, I. (2020). 40 Stellingen over de Wetenschap (p. 42). Boom. ↑

    7. In ‘t Veld, R. J. (2004). Voorbij de Arrogantie van Onbestuurbaarheid: Een Terugblik op Veertig Jaar Ontwikkeling van Universitair Bestuur in Nederland. In A. Dorrestijn & J. Kessels (Eds.), Academie in Verandering (p. 33), Utrecht University. ↑

    8. Van Ginkel, J. A. (2004). Verschillen die Tellen. In A. Dorrestijn & J. Kellsels (Eds.), Academie in Verandering (p. 20). Utrecht University. ↑

    9. In ‘t Veld, R. J. (2004). Voorbij de Arrogantie van Onbestuurbaarheid: Een Terugblik op Veertig Jaar Ontwikkeling van Universitair Bestuur in Nederland. In A. Dorrestijn & J. Kessels (Eds.), Academie in Verandering (p. 36), Utrecht University. ↑

    10. For more on the development of funding for universities, see the following collection of essays: Snijders, P., Sjitsma, W., Baan, A. & van Ireland, P. (2023). De bekostiging van universiteiten in Nederland, heden verleden en toekomst. Verzamelde essays bij het afscheid van drs. F. Kootstra. Tilburg University. ↑

    11. Kuijpers-Groensmit, C. T. M. (2004). De Zigzagweg naar Medezeggenschap. In A. Dorrestijn & J. Kessels (Eds.), Academie in Verandering (p. 56). Utrecht University. ↑

    12. Ritzen, J. M. M. & Mattens, W. (2004) Van Rups Tot Vlinder. In A. Dorrestijn & J. Kessels (Eds.), Academie in Verandering (p. 92). Utrecht University. ↑

    13. Jamin, H. (2001). Kennis als Opdracht: De Universiteit Utrecht 1636-2001 (p. 188). Uitgeverij Matrijs. ↑

    14. Glastra van Loon, J. F. (2019). Groeien Organisatieproblemen van de Universiteit. Universiteit en Hogeschool, 11(5), 289-301. ↑

    15. Righart, H. (1995). De Eindeloze Jaren Zestig: Geschiedenis van een Generatieconflict (p. 257-61). Arbeiderspers. ↑

    16. For a more comprehensive overview, see: Kuijpers-Groensmit, C. T. M. (2004). De Zigzagweg naar Medezeggenschap. In A. Dorrestijn & J. Kessels (Eds.), Academie in Verandering (p. 55). Utrecht University. ↑

    17. Kuijpers-Groensmit, C. T. M. (2004). De Zigzagweg naar Medezeggenschap. In A. Dorrestijn & J. Kessels (Eds.), Academie in Verandering (p. 44). Utrecht University. ↑

    18. Van Rooy, Y. (2004). Besturen Tussen Overheid en Markt. In A. Dorrestijn, & J. Kessels (Eds.). Academie in Verandering (p. 104). Utrecht University. ↑

    19. Dorsman, L. (2010). Professionalisering als Probleem, De Val van een College van Bestuur. In L. J. Dorsman & P. J. Knegtmans (Eds.), Het Universitaire Bedrijf: Over Professionalisering van Onderzoek, Bestuur en Beheer (p. 55). Verloren. The vigorous worldwide discussions regarding the terminations of collaborations with Israeli universities because of the human rights violations by the Israeli political regime relive the discussions of old times. ↑

    20. Jamin, H. (2001). Kennis als Opdracht: De Universiteit Utrecht 1636-2001 (p. 198). Uitgeverij Matrijs. ↑

    21. Parliamentary Papers II 1995/96, 24 646, no. 3, p. 23. ↑

    22. See also: Kummeling, H. R. B. M., Duijkersloot, A. P. W., Minderman, G. D., Van Schagen, J. A. & Zijlstra, S. E. (1999). Verkenningen van verantwoordelijkheid, Ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid voor het toezicht op de financiën van zelfstandige instellingen op het terrein van onderwijs en onderzoek (p.133 et seq., esp. p. 136). W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink. This had always been a sticking point with the Ministry, by the way. In this relationship, as in many others, the art of letting go proves difficult. ↑

    23. Also compare: Van Rooy, Y. (2004). Besturen Tussen Overheid en Markt. In A. Dorrestijn, & J. Kessels (Eds.). Academie in Verandering (p. 111). Utrecht University. ↑

    24. LSVb and LOF. (1997). De MUB meester (p. 19). Landelijke Studenten Vakbond. ↑

    25. Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (1993). Article 9.18. Wet op het Hoger onderwijs en Wetenschappelijk onderzoek (WHW). Retrieved from: wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0005682/2024-07-01 ↑

    26. For more on this: Zoontjes, P. J. J. (2021). Tekst & Toelichting WHW 2021 (p. 60). SDU Uitgever. ↑

    27. Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (1993). Article 9.18. Wet op het Hoger onderwijs en Wetenschappelijk onderzoek (WHW). Retrieved from: wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0005682/2024-07-01 ↑

    28. Parliamentary letter from the Minister of Education, Culture and Science, dated September 9, 2021, ref. no. 29387772. See also the evaluation reports by Berenschot and ReseachNed sent with this parliamentary letter. ↑

    29. Dorsman, L. J. & Knegtmans, P. J. (2010). Het Universitaire Bedrijf: Over Professionalisering van Onderzoek, Bestuur en Beheer (p. 7). Verloren. Incidentally, the authors themselves place some caveats on that analysis. ↑

    30. See especially Chapters 1 and 2. ↑

    31. Van der Zwaan, B. (2017). Higher Education in 2040: A Global Approach (p. 59). Amsterdam University Press. ↑

    32. Lijphart, A. (2008). Unequal Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma. In A. Lijphart (Ed.), Thinking about Democracy. Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice (pp. 201-31). Routledge. ↑

    33. De Boer, H., Goedegebuure, L. & Huisman, J. (2008). Gezonde Spanning: Beleidsevaluatie van de MUB: Eindrapport (p. 43). Center for Higher Education Policy Studies, Twente University. ↑

    34. Hoger Onderwijs Persbureau. (2019, June 26). Opkomst bij verkiezingen universiteitraden steeds lager. Erasmus Magazine. erasmusmagazine.nl/2019/06/26/opkomst-bij-verkiezingen-universiteitsraden-steeds-lager/ (Consulted May 28, 2022). ↑

    35. Bronkhorst, X. (2022, May 23). Vuur 7 zetels, PvdUS 5: dramatisch lage opkomst. DUB. dub.uu.nl/nl/nieuws/vuur-7-zetels-pvdus-5-dramatisch-lage-opkomst (Consulted May 20, 2022). ↑

    36. Kuijpers-Groensmit, C. T. M. (2004). De Zigzagweg naar Medezeggenschap. In A. Dorrestijn & J. Kessels (Eds.), Academie in Verandering (p. 47). Utrecht University. ↑

    37. See the Policy Memorandum on Higher Education and Science, dated June 17, 2022, no. 33080266. ↑

    38. Several billions are at stake. See, for example: Commissie Nationaal Groeifonds. (2022). Rapport Tweede Beoordelingsronde. Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs. ↑

    39. For research on how that works, see: Ten Thije, J. D., Groothoff, F., Hagar, T., Mulder, K., Naber, K., Spee, S., Sudhoff, S. (2022). How to be Inclusive without Excluding Others? Medezeggenschap & Meertaligheid op de Universiteit Utrecht. Luistertaal/Lingua Receptiva. Utrecht University. ↑

    40. See: Ministry of Education, Culture & Science. (2004). Wetenschapsbudget 2004. Ministry of Education, Culture & Science. See also the letter from the Minister of Education, Culture and Science to the executive boards, dated 27 January 2005, OWB/AI/04-57055. Remarkably, this was done without amending the law, but through a new interpretation of the legal phrase ‘transferring knowledge for the benefit of society’ (Art. 1:3, section 1, HRA) in the aforementioned letter. ↑

    41. For more information, see: Kummeling, H. R. B. M. (2018). Onafhankelijk onderzoek en openbaar bestuur. In B. J. van Ettekoven, P. Polak & L. Verhey (Eds.), Rechtsorde en bestuur: Liber Amicorum Piet Hein Donner (p. 211). Boom Juridisch. ↑

    42. See also: Francot, L. & De Vries, B. (2010). Adieu von Humboldt? Over Domme Organisaties en Slimme Mensen. In L. J. Dorsman & P. J. Knegtmans (Eds.), Het Universitaire Bedrijf: Over Professionalisering van Onderzoek, Bestuur en Beheer (p. 81). Verloren. ↑

    43. Van de Donk, W. (2014). Pas op voor het Weten in Schappen. In A. Verbrugge & J. van Baardewijk (Eds.), Waartoe is de universiteit op aarde? (p. 141). Boom. ↑

    44. Also see the following LERU position paper: Van den Akker, W. & Spaapen, J. (2017). Productive Interactions: Societal Impact of Academic Research in the Knowledge Society. League of European Research Universities. ↑

    45. Van der Zwaan, B. (2017). Higher Education in 2040. A Global Approach (p. 61). Amsterdam University Press. ↑

    46. Dorsman, L. J. & Knegtmans, P. J. (2010). Het Universitaire Bedrijf: Over Professionalisering van Onderzoek, Bestuur en Beheer (p. 8). Verloren. ↑

    47. Lorenz, C. (2014). Feiten Fiksen, Over Tellen, Meten en Zeker Weten. In A. Verbrugge & J. van Baardewijk (Eds.), Waartoe is de Universiteit op Aarde? (p. 77). Boom. ↑

    48. Netherlands Court of Audit. (2020). Resultaten Verantwoordingsonderzoek 2020 Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap (VIII): Rapport bij het Jaarverslag 2020 (pp. 41-2). ↑

    49. Van der Zwaan, B. (2017). Higher Education in 2040. A Global Approach (p. 62). Amsterdam University Press. ↑

    50. A term that is often used with disdain, albeit unjustly. In the eyes of one of the patriarchs of the concept, Max Weber, it is above all a rational tool in the hands of legal authorities that contributes to predictability, responsibility, and accountability; see: Weber, M. (1964). Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Studienausgabe Herausgegeben von Johannes Winkelman, Zweiter Halbband (p. 703 et seq.). Kiepenheuer & Witsch. ↑

    51. See also Chapter 2. ↑

    52. Naezer, M., Van den Brink, M. C. L. & Benschop, Y. (2019). Harassment in Dutch Academia: Exploring Manifestations, Facilitating Factors, Effects and Solutions. Landelijk Netwerk van Vrouwelijke Hoogleraren. Consulted from: lnvh.nl ↑

    53. See also: KNAW. (2022). Sociale veiligheid in de Nederlandse wetenschap 2022. knaw.nl/publicaties/sociale-veiligheid-de-nederlandse-wetenschap-van-papier-naar-praktijk-0. In this report, the organisational structure and the power differentials that exist within it are viewed as important causes of social unsafety. ↑

    54. The KNAW has also acknowledged this. See the position paper: KNAW. (2018). Spagaat of Duet? Position paper: Verwevenheid van Education and research aan Nederlandse Universities. It is therefore striking to note that the KNAW undertakes few activities in the field of education, let alone assuming responsibilities in that regard. ↑

    55. See: Kummeling, H. R. B. M. (2020). De Rijzende Rechtswetenschap. In B. de Vries, E. Mak, L. van den Berge, T. E. Riethuis, H. Tigchelaar, J. Kiewiet, S. D. Burri & T. de Sterke (Eds.), Rechtstheorie en Praktijk – een Liber Amicorum: Beschouwingen Rondom het Werk van Professor A. M. Hol (p. 263). Boom Juridisch. ↑

    56. Laloux, F. (2014). Reinventing Organizations. Nelson Parker. ↑

    57. Laloux, F. (2014). Reinventing Organizations (p. 56). Nelson Parker. ↑

    58. Kummeling, H. R. B. M. (2022, January 11). Academische vrijheid in tijden van wakkerte en cancelcultuur. Nederlandse rechtsstaat. nederlandrechtsstaat.nl/academische-vrijheid-in-tijden-van-wakkerte-en-cancelcultuur/ ↑

    59. Noordegraaf, M. (2015). Hybrid professionalism and beyond: (New) Forms of public professionalism in changing organizational and social contexts. Journal of Professions and Organization, 2(2), 187-206. ↑

    60. Noordegraaf, M. (2020). Protective or connective professionalism? How connected professionals can (still) act as autonomous and authoritative experts. Journal of Professions and Organization, 7(2) 205–23. ↑

    61. Kinzelbach, K., Saliba, I., Spannagel, J. & Quinn, R. (2021). Putting the Academic Freedom Index into Action (p. 4). Global Public Policies Institute. ↑

    62. Sels, R. (2021). Academische vrijheid en de vrijheid van meningsuiting [Lecture on the opening of the Academic Year 2021 – 2022]. KU Leuven. Retrieved from: kuleuven.be ↑

    63. CRvB July 26, 2012, ECLI:NL:CRVB:20212:BX2797, r.o. 4.3. ↑

    64. KNAW. (2021). Academische Vrijheid in Nederland: Een Begripsanalyse en Richtsnoer (p. 32). knaw.nl/publicaties/academische-vrijheid-nederland ↑

    65. See also: Mentink, D., Vermeulen, B. P. & Zoontjens, P. J. J. (2021). Article 23. In E. M. H. Hirsch Ballin, E. Janse de Jonge & G. J. Leenknegt (Eds.), Uitleg van de Grondwet (p. 526). Boom juridisch. ↑

    66. Laloux, F. (2014). Reinventing Organizations (pp. 134-5). Nelson Parker. ↑

    67. Laloux, F. (2014). Reinventing Organizations (p. 99). Nelson Parker. ↑

    68. For a description of the organisation of Buurtzorg, see: Laloux, F. (2014). Reinventing Organizations (p. 62). Nelson Parker. ↑

    69. This is not to say that university of the future should not answer for their performance. On the contrary, public funding implies public accountability. Hopefully, however, the extend to which they should be held accountable will decrease in the future. ↑

    70. Mostafa, A. M. S. & Bottomley, P. A. (2020). Self-Sacrificial Leadership and Employee Behaviours: An Examination of the Role of Organizational Social Capital. Journal of Business Ethics, 161(3), 641-52. doi.org/10.1007/s10551-018-3964-5 ↑

    71. Some of these reflections are taken from: Kummeling, H. R. B. M. (2022). Revitalisering van de Universitaire Democratie. In W. Conen & J. Oude Mulders (Eds.), Accumulatie van Menselijk Kapitaal: Een Levenslang Proces. Liber Amicorum (pp. 116-23). Utrecht University School of Economics. ↑

    72. These are also the issues raised by the Minister of Education, Culture and Science in his response to the evaluation of the Strengthening Governance Act (Letter to Parliament from the Minister of Education, Culture and Science, dated September 9, 2021, ref. no. 29387772). ↑

    73. Kuijpers-Groensmit, C. T. M. (2004). De Zigzagweg naar Medezeggenschap. In A. Dorrestijn & J. Kessels (Eds.), Academie in Verandering (p. 45). Utrecht University. ↑

    74. At the time of writing, the position existed only at the RUG, the UvA and UU. ↑

    75. One emeritus professor who regularly called for this was H. Wijnberg. See: Wijnberg, H. (1993, September 4).Weer instellen van de senaat is redding universiteit. NRC Handelsblad. ↑

    76. Wijnberg, H. (2006, July 26) Universiteit heeft een senaat nodig. NRC Handelsblad. ↑

    77. Torfs, R. (2014). Moed Als Universitair Ideaal. In A. Verbrugge & J. van Baardewijk (Eds.), Waartoe is de Universiteit op Aarde? (p. 251). Boom. ↑

    78. Cohen, F. (2020). De Ideale Universiteit (p. 42). Prometheus. ↑

    79. Bol, C. (1986). De restauratieve façade. In H. M. von der Dunk, W. P. Heere & A. W. Reinink (Eds.), Tussen Ivoren Toren & Grootbedrijf: De Utrechtse Universiteit 1936-1986 (p. 64). Uitgeverij Gary Schwartz. ↑

    80. See also the entertaining report: Geyl, P. (2009). Ik die zo weinig in het verleden Leef: Autobiografie 1887-1940 (p. 288). Wereldbibliotheek. ↑

    81. Bod, R., Breuker, R. & Robeijns, I. (2020). 40 Stellingen over de Wetenschap (pp. 54-5). Boom.

      Van Ginkel, J. A. (2004). Verschillen die Tellen. In A. Dorrestijn & J. Kellsels (Eds.), Academie in Verandering (p. 13). Utrecht University. ↑

    82. Bod, R., Breuker, R. & Robeijns, I. (2020). 40 Stellingen over de Wetenschap (p. 54). Boom. ↑

    83. Van Ginkel, J. A. (2004). Verschillen die Tellen. In A. Dorrestijn & J. Kellsels (Eds.), Academie in Verandering (p. 13). Utrecht University.

      Estermann, T., Nokkala, T. & Steinel, M. (2011). University Autonomy in Europe II. European University Association. ↑

    84. Vossensteyn, H., Kolster, R., De Boer, H. & Jongbloed, B. (2015). Bestuursbenoemingen in Europa: Een Internationaal Vergelijkende Verkenning. Center for Higher Education Policy Studies. ↑

    85. Van Steijn, F. (2017). Het Rectoren College 1955-heden. In L. J. Dorsman & P. J. Knegtmans (Eds.), Universiteit en Identiteit (p. 93). Verloren. ↑

    86. Burkens, M. C., Kummeling, H. R. B. M., Uzman, J., Vermeulen, B. P. & Widdershoven, R. J. G. M. (2022). Beginselen van de Democratische Rechtsstaat (pp. 339-40). Kluwer. ↑

    87. Amkreutz, R. (2018). Onder Rectoren: Achter de Schermen van Onze Universiteiten. Van Halewyck. ↑

    88. Klaas, B. (2021). Corruptible: Who Gets Power and How it Changes Us (p. 90). John Murray. ↑

    89. The Netherlands Institute for Social Research. (2015). Meer democratie, minder politiek? Een studie naar de politieke opinie in Nederland (p. 35). ↑

    90. Burkens, M. C., Kummeling, H. R. B. M., Uzman, J., Vermeulen, B. P. & Widdershoven, R. J. G. M. (2022). Beginselen van de Democratische Rechtsstaat. Kluwer. ↑

    91. 320 At the time of writing, it was still uncertain whether there would be enough support for a constitutional amendment after the second reading (Parliamentary Papers 35219). ↑

    92. Echoing the work of: Luhmann, N. (1975). Legitimation durch Verfahren. Luchterhand. ↑

    93. Part of this explanation is derived from: Burkens, M. C., Kummeling, H. R. B. M., Uzman, J., Vermeulen, B. P. & Widdershoven, R. J. G. M. (2022). Beginselen van de Democratische Rechtsstaat. Kluwer. ↑

    94. Leyenaar, M. (2009). De Burger aan Zet, Burgerforum: Theorie en Praktijk. Radboud University Nijmegen ↑

    95. Leyenaar, M. (2007). De Last van Ruggespraak [Speech]. Radboud University Nijmegen. ↑

    96. Van Reybrouck, D. (2013). Tegen Verkiezingen. De Bezige Bij. ↑

    97. Van Reybrouck will be the last to claim intellectual property rights for the concept of deliberative democracy. He declares himself indebted to people like James Fishkin, who seems to have invented the term. See: Fishkin, J. (1998, August). Washington: The Case for a National Caucus. The Atlantic. ↑

    98. Rossanvallon, P. (2012). Democratie en Tegendemocratie. Boom. ↑

    99. Another intriguing work is: Ferguson, N. (2013). The Great Degeneration: How Institutions Decay and Institutions Die. Penguin Books. ↑

    100. For more on this, see: Cohen, M. J. (2015). De vierde D [Inaugural lecture]. Leiden University. ↑

    101. The ‘G’ stands for ‘Group’ in imitation of the economic summits G8 and G20. 1000 does not represent a real number of participants here. That number would also simply not be manageable. A distinction is also made between ‘citizens’ summits’, which are entirely separate existing structures, and ‘citizens’ councils’ that are integrated into administrative structures and are also aimed at influencing policy. See: Binnema, H. & Boogaard, G. (2016). De G1000: Meer dan een Experiment? In G. Boogaard, A. Michels, J. Cohen, P. G. S. M. Smets, H. Binnema, & M. Vlind (Eds.), G1000, Ervaringen met Burgertoppen (p. 31). Boom bestuurskunde.

      Such a distinction is not yet commonplace, and certainly not yet established in constitutional law. We therefore omit it here. ↑

    102. This description is adopted from Smith, G. & Wales, C. (2000). Citizens’ Juries and Deliberative Democracy. Political Studies, 48(1), 55. doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00250 ↑

    103. Rovers, E. (2022). Nu is het aan Ons: Oproep tot Echte Democratie. De Correspondent. ↑

    104. Smith, G. & Wales, C. (2000). Citizens’ Juries and Deliberative Democracy. Political Studies, 48(1), 61. doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00250 ↑

    105. In doing so, Van Reybrouck particularly denounces the role of the media, see: Van Reybrouck, D. (2013). Tegen Verkiezingen (p. 54). De Bezige Bij. ↑

    106. Cohen, M. J. (2015). De vierde D [Speech] (p. 10). Leiden University. ↑

    107. See also: Cohen, M. J. (2016). Epiloog: Observaties… en Toch een Kloof. In G. Boogaard, A. Michels, J. Cohen, P. G. S. M. Smets, H. Binnema & M. Vlind (Eds.), G1000. Ervaringen met Burgertoppen (p. 103). Boom bestuurskunde. ↑

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